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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  importance  of considering  coupled  interactions  across  multiple  population  scales  has  not  previously
been  studied  for highly  pathogenic  avian  inﬂuenza  (HPAI)  in  the British  commercial  poultry  industry.  By
simulating  the within-ﬂock  transmission  of  HPAI  using  a deterministic  S-E-I-R  model,  and  by  incorporat-
ing  an  additional  environmental  class  representing  infectious  faeces,  we tracked  the  build-up  of infectious
faeces  within  a poultry  house  over  time.  A measure  of the  transmission  risk  (TR)  was  computed  for  each
farm  by linking  the  amount  of  infectious  faeces  present  each  day  of an outbreak  with  data  describing  the
daily  on-farm  visit  schedules  for  a major  British  catching  company.  Larger  ﬂocks  tended  to  have  greater
levels  of  these  catching-team  visits.  However,  where  density-dependent  contact  was assumed,  faster
outbreak  detection  (according  to  an assumed  mortality  threshold)  led to a  decreased  opportunity  for
catching-team  visits  to  coincide  with  an  outbreak.  For this  reason,  maximum  TR-levels  were  found  for
mid-range  ﬂock  sizes  (∼25,000–35,000  birds).  When  assessing  all factors  simultaneously  using  multi-
variable  linear  regression  on the simulated  outputs,  those  related  to  the  pattern  of  catching-team  visits
had the largest  effect  on  TR,  with  the most  important  movement-related  factor depending  on  the  mode  of
transmission.  Using  social  network  analysis  on  a further  database  to  inform  a measure  of between-farm
connectivity,  we  identiﬁed  a large  fraction  of  farms  (28%)  that  had  both  a  high  TR  and  a  high  poten-
tial  impact  at  the between  farm  level.  Our  results  have  counter-intuitive  implications  for between-farm
spread  that could  not  be predicted  based  on  ﬂock  size  alone,  and together  with  further  knowledge  of  the
relative  importance  of transmission  risk  and  impact,  could  have  implications  for  improved  targeting  of
control  measures.ntroduction
In social network analysis, when applied to epidemiology, it
as typically been assumed that links between network nodes are
tatic and therefore represent ﬁxed, persistent contacts during an
ndividual’s infectious period (Huerta and Tsimring, 2002; Keeling,
999; Meyers et al., 2005). Comparatively few models have allowed
inks to be dynamic – reﬂecting that, in reality, an individual’s con-
acts are likely to change over time (Eames and Keeling, 2004; Kao
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et al., 2007; Volz and Meyers, 2009) and that links really represent
the existence of the possibility of one or more ‘impulses’ whereby
the infectious agent is passed from node to node. The dynamics
of infection at the node-level has largely been a separate line of
research (Gross and Blasius, 2008). In the few instances where
cross-scale dynamics (i.e. combining the dynamics of the nodes
and network structure) have been considered, they have revealed
impacts on invasion and persistence thresholds that have impor-
tant implications for disease control (Gross et al., 2006; Hufnagel
et al., 2004).
Within the context of livestock diseases, simple models of
static networks have assessed the beneﬁt of including ‘transmis-
Open access under CC BY license.sion networks’ deﬁned over the infectious period of the disease in
question, and considering only network links thinned in inverse
proportion to the probability that they are infectious (Kao et al.,
2006), whilst more recent analyses have focused in more detail on
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he network dynamics (Bajardi et al., 2011; Vernon and Keeling,
009). The impact of “super-shedding” cattle on persistence pro-
ides one example where the role of within-herd (node-level)
ynamics in population transmission has been studied (Liu et al.,
007). In general, however, relatively little attention has been given
o the interaction between node-level dynamics and network links.
Whether it is important to consider these factors in unison
epends on the relative rates of change at the farm and network lev-
ls (Kao et al., 2007; Ochab and Gora, 2011; Volz and Meyers, 2009).
or diseases such as highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza (HPAI),
hich spreads rapidly at the farm level (i.e. node dynamics) (Bos
t al., 2010; Elbers et al., 2004; Yoon et al., 2005), the opportunity for
nward spread via epidemiologically relevant industry movements
ill depend on the timing of these movements.
HPAI is a public health threat with the potential to cause large
conomic losses; therefore, all countries require good contingency
lans to limit the impact of outbreaks in commercial poultry. As
he control of HPAI hinges on rapid detection and notiﬁcation,
mproved understanding of within-ﬂock transmission dynamics
ould help design measures to reduce transmission from infected
remises. These dynamics are known to be inﬂuenced by manage-
ent factors, such as ﬂock size, and inﬂuence the time-to-detection
f an outbreak (Savill et al., 2008). Although the implications of the
ithin-farm transmission of HPAI for indirect farm-to-farm trans-
ission via movements of people, vehicles and equipment has been
onsidered (Dorea et al., 2010), previous studies have not consid-
red in detail the dynamics of within-ﬂock transmission (such as
he impact of ﬂock size and assumed transmission mode) or the
mpact of the timing of on-farm movement activities.
Catching team personnel (through clothing and equipment),
orklift trucks, and slaughterhouse vehicles are considered to be
mportant risk factors for the spread of disease within the British
ommercial poultry industry (Anon, 2006; Gittins and Canning,
006). Using temporally explicit data describing the daily on-farm
isit schedules for a major poultry catching company located in
ngland (Dent et al., 2011), we explored the interaction between
he within-ﬂock transmission dynamics of HPAI, measured in
ontinuous time, and temporally explicit catching-team visits,
easured in discrete time. These on-farm visits made by catch-
ng teams represent the risk of fomites (i.e. people, vehicles or
quipment) being exposed to HPAI and subsequently spreading
nfection through their movements, and not the movement of the
irds themselves.
We  present an explicit exploration of the interaction across
hese time-scales by combining a deterministic model of disease
pread (given the typically large ﬂock sizes for commercial poultry)
ith the empirical data describing on-farm catching-team visits.
s these on-farm visits represent ‘impulses’ enabling the spread
f HPAI between-farms, we gain insights that have implications for
he dynamics of network links between premises. Our results high-
ight the impact of the characteristics of bird-to-bird transmission
n the potential for spread from infected premises. Additionally,
e identify the farm-level factors that are predictive of high rela-
ive transmission risk (see below) and discuss how this can be used
o inform the risk of HPAI spread between farms.
ethods
ithin-ﬂock transmission
A S-E-I-R model was used to track the number of birds in suscep-
ible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) and removed (R) classes. The ‘R’
lass represents the end of a birds’ infectious period as a result of
PAI-induced mortality and therefore these birds no longer con-
ribute to the force of infection within the ﬂock. In addition, aics 5 (2013) 67–76
‘F’ class was incorporated to represent the environmental build-
up of infectious faecal material within the poultry house. This ‘F’
class determined the potential for the exposure of fomites such
as catching team personnel, forklift trucks, slaughterhouse vehi-
cles and equipment. In order to gain a better understanding of the
relationships amongst several ﬂock-level factors under different
transmission mode assumptions, we  captured average effects using
a deterministic framework and thus do not account for stochastic
variability in the within-farm dynamics. However, we do consider
uncertainty and between farm variability in the parameter values
of this model (see below).
The within-ﬂock model was developed to reﬂect ﬂoor-reared
broiler poultry, which was  the predominant production type cap-
tured by our catching-company movement data. These data reﬂect
the daily schedules of the catching teams that are responsible for
transporting poultry to the slaughterhouse vehicle; in the case of
broiler chicken production, this either relates to ﬂock thinning, par-
tial bird depopulation or total bird depopulation at the end of the
production cycle.
Each bird was  assumed to excrete ε grams of faeces per hour;
εI therefore gave the quantity of infectious faeces excreted by
the ﬂock each hour. The amount of infectious faecal material was
assumed to decay at 5% per hour, consistent with available exper-
imental data (Shortridge et al., 1998) and a published within-ﬂock
model for HPAI in poultry (Savill et al., 2006, 2008).
As the relative contribution of different transmission mech-
anisms is poorly understood (Spekreijse et al., 2011a), the total
infection pressure, ˇ, was  modelled as the sum of the infection
pressure due to two independent routes; namely transmission
via: (i) aerosol (ˇa), which represented direct bird-to-bird con-
tact (i.e. dependent on ‘I’); and (ii) via infectious faeces (ˇf), which
represented indirect contact via faecal contamination of dust and
drinking/feeding equipment (i.e. dependent on ‘F’). As the mecha-
nisms of bird-to-bird contact (direct or indirect) and the likely rates
of contact are poorly understood, both frequency-dependent (FD)
and density-dependent (DD) modes of transmission were consid-
ered. For FD transmission the ODEs are given by
dS
dt
= −S
(
ˇa
I
N
+ ˇf
F
N
)
,
dE
dt
= S
(
ˇa
I
N
+ ˇf
F
N
)
− ıE,
dI
dt
= ıE − I,
dR
dt
= I,
dF
dt
= εI − F
The expressions for DD transmission are identical except that
the force of infection is replaced with
ˇa
n¯
I + ˇf
n¯
F,
where the transmission rates are scaled by the mean ﬂock size (n¯)
to facilitate comparison with the FD models. Table 1 contains a full
list of parameter values and ranges.
We chose a range of values for the basic reproduction number,
R0, from 2 to 38 (corresponding to  ˇ values ranging 0.01–10 h−1)
to explore a spectrum of scenarios that are covered by experimen-
tal and modelling studies. For example, estimates of R0 are as low
as 1.2 and 2.2 in experimental transmission studies and ﬁeld data
respectively (Bouma et al., 2009; Spekreijse et al., 2011b; Tiensin
et al., 2007), while estimates as high as 22–66 have been assumed
in mathematical models due to the greater ﬂock size and infection
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Table  1
Default parameter values for the within-ﬂock highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza transmission model.
Parameter Description Default values/ranges References
N Mean farm-level ﬂock size (ratio of number of poultry to
number of poultry houses)
4500–45,600 birds PND and CCDa
n¯ Median ﬂock size across all farms (i.e. across all N) 21,500 PND and CCDa
ˇa Transmission rate via aerosol (h−1) 0.01–10 (incrementing by 0.5) Bouma et al. (2009), Spekreijse et al.
(2011b), Tiensin et al. (2007), van der
Goot et al. (2005)
ˇf Transmission rate via dispersal of infectious faeces (h−1) 0.01–10 (incrementing by 0.5)
ˇ  Total infection pressure (h−1) ˇa + ˇf
ı Rate of infectiousness onset (h−1) 0.021 Bouma et al. (2009)
 Highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza induced mortality rate (h−1) 0.01 Tian et al. (2005), van der Goot et al.
(2003, 2005),  Webster et al. (2006)
ε Rate of excretion of faecal material in grams (h−1) 1 –
  Rate of decay of infectious faecal material (h−1) 0.05 Shortridge et al. (1998)
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ba PND, Poultry Network Database; CCD, Catching Company Database.
ressure expected within a commercial ﬂock (Savill et al., 2006;
harkey et al., 2008; Truscott et al., 2007). Supplementary Material
ection 1 includes details of model sensitivity to the R0 range.
R0 was calculated as the dominant eigenvalue of the Next Gen-
ration Matrix, (M), where
 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 xa · 1 xf ·
1

1 0 0
0
ε

0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
nd where xa = ˇa/N and xf = ˇf/N for FD transmission, and xa = ˇa/n¯
nd xf = ˇf /n¯ for DD transmission.
The average ﬂock size per farm (N, the ratio of number of poul-
ry to number of poultry houses) was divided into quintiles, using
he distribution obtained from the Catching Company Database
mean = 22,465 birds, range = 4571–45,667 birds). Twenty values
ach of ˇa and ˇf were chosen to cover the possible range likely on
arms (0.01–10 h−1). All ﬂock size and  ˇ combinations (400 pair-
ise combinations of ˇa and ˇf) were run for both FD and DD
ransmission modes and for each quintile. In total, 4000 outbreaks
400  ˇ combinations × 5 ﬂock sizes × 2 transmission scenarios)
ere simulated using Matlab v.7.8.0 (The MathWorks, Inc., Nat-
ck, MA,  USA). Each simulation represented transmission within a
ingle ﬂock and one single infected bird initiated each outbreak at
ime zero.
elative transmission risk
Model simulations were used to explore the effect of within-
ock transmission characteristics on a farms’ relative transmission
isk (TR) (i.e. relative across farms). Empirical data was obtained
rom a major catching company in England which provided the
aily schedules of catching-teams recorded on an hourly basis. This
atching Company Database represented 68 catching teams visit-
ng a total of 415 farms over a total period of 950 days (see Dent
t al., 2011 and Supplementary Material Section 2). Each farms’
ecorded catching-team visit days were given a value determined
y the total number of slaughterhouse vehicle loads (ϕ) associ-
ted. The TR of an infected farm was then computed by matching
ach of their daily on-farm visits to the corresponding day of all
he simulated within-ﬂock outbreaks that matched the relevant
ock-size.
Speciﬁcally, for farm i given a speciﬁed day of incursion z (the
ay within the movement data that was identiﬁed as day zero of the
imulated outbreak), the relative transmission risk TRi,z was given
y the product of the amount of infectious faecal material (Fi,z,t) andthe number of vehicle loads (ϕi,z,t), summed over each day, t, of the
outbreak:
TRi,z =
tmax∑
t=1
Fi,z,t · i,z,t
To account for the intra-farm heterogeneity in movement
pattern (i.e. both frequency of catching-team visits and bird trans-
portation capacity of slaughterhouse vehicles), iterations over all
possible incursion days (z) were run. As a result of this intra-farm
heterogeneity in the movement patterns, the number of incursion
day iterations varied per farm. An overall relative transmission risk
at the farm-level, TRi,sim, was  calculated by averaging across all
incursion day iterations (z):
TRi,sim =
∑zmax
z=1 TRi,z
ni
,
where ni represents the total number of iterations (z) correspond-
ing to farm i. We consider two  types of infection incursion. First,
it was  assumed that an incursion event would occur only on
movement days, corresponding to farm-to-farm transmission via a
catching team whose previous visit was  to an infectious premises.
Second, incursions could occur on any day thereby representing
other sources of introductions such as a wildlife reservoir (for
details see Supplementary Material Section 3).
It was  assumed that once a threshold-level of dead birds (known
as the mortality threshold, MT)  had been reached, the outbreak
would be detected and any further risk of transmission prevented.
Following an outbreak of HPAI H7N7 in the Netherlands in 2003, a
MT of 0.5% (of the initial susceptible ﬂock) per day for two consec-
utive days was recommended for Dutch broiler producers (Elbers
et al., 2007). However, MTs  are recognised to vary according to sev-
eral factors such as production type, management practices and
bird age and a wider likely range of 0.03–3.33% was  found for poul-
try producers in Georgia, USA (Vieira et al., 2009). As the likely MT
triggering HPAI detection in British poultry farms is not known we
considered a range of MTs  and present results for an intermediate
threshold of 0.5%, corresponding to the Dutch recommendation.
Identifying predictors of high relative transmission risk
To identify factors that have the greatest effect on the prob-
ability of transmission from a farm, we produced a general
linear regression model to compare the model inputs with the
predicted relative transmission risk. To remove the effect of uncer-
tainty in transmission parameters, the farm-level transmission
risk (TRi) corresponding to a mid-range transmissibility scenario
(ˇa + ˇf ∼ 10) was  chosen. We wished to identify the most impor-
tant drivers of transmission risk, therefore only main effects in
70 S. Nickbakhsh et al. / Epidemics 5 (2013) 67–76
Table 2
Summary of catching-team on-farm visit factors (n = 108 farms).
Variable Description Median value (range) or distribution
Number of poultry Total number of birds held per farm – used as a proxy for overall farm size 110,963 birds (12,270–384,000 birds)
Number of houses Total number of poultry houses per farm 6 houses (1–14 houses)
Average ﬂock size Ratio of total number of poultry to total number of houses per farm 21,583 birds (4571–45,667 birds)
Total  number of catching days Total number of days with catching-team visits over entire Catching Company
Data per farm
71 days (9–257 days)
Mean  time between catching
daysa
Mean number of days between consecutive catching-team visit days per farm 12 days (4–92 days)
Mean daily caught birds The total number of birds caught per day, averaged across all individual
catching days, per farm
2,055,393 birds (18,982–11,740,723 birds)
Mean  daily vehicle loads The total number of slaughterhouse vehicle loads per day, averaged across all
individual catching days, per farm
354 loads (24–2048 loads)
Between-farm association
frequency
A measure of farm-level network connectivity, calculated as the total number
of  associations in a between-farm matrix of associations via slaughterhouses,
catching companies or company integration
344 farm associations (105–1453 farm
associations)
Integration Binary categorisation of whether a farm is associated with an integrated
company
66% = integratedb
Regional location Categorisation of farms based on their regional locations: North and West of
England and Wales
9.26–75.9%c
TRFD Mean farm-level relative transmission risks across all ‘incursion day’
iterations, assuming frequency-dependent transmission
3.69 (0.00002–22.30)
TRDD Mean farm-level relative transmission risks across all ‘incursion day’
iterations, assuming density-dependent transmission
2.44 (0.00001–23.18)
TR
FD
i Farm-level relative transmission risk assuming frequency-dependent
transmission for a mid-range transmissibility scenario corresponding to ˇa ∼ 5
and ˇf ∼ 5
4.67 (0.017 0–18.26)
TR
DD
i Farm-level relative transmission risk assuming density-dependent
transmission for a mid-range transmissibility scenario corresponding to ˇa ∼ 5
and ˇf ∼ 5
2.29 (0.004–14.52)
a The median dispersal index (variance-to-mean ratio) for the farm-level time-interval between consecutive visit days was 26 days (range: 11–348 days).
b Based on 100 records for which integration status was known.
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he statistical model were considered. For full details of predictor
ariables see Table 2.
A square root transformation was applied to TRi as this improved
he normality of residuals and decreased heteroscedasticity. The
odels were built using a backwards stepwise method and AIC to
ssess the ﬁt at each stage in the model development. The inclusion
f ‘company integration’ as a random effect was  considered but
ot included in the ﬁnal models due to the few companies with
n adequate group size (only two companies had more than two
ssociated farm premises).
The most inﬂuential data points, as identiﬁed by their Cook’s
tatistic, were assessed for their impact on the model coefﬁcients
nd their signiﬁcance levels. To assess the overall effect of covari-
tes in the model, the relative transmission risk was predicted using
he linear model with all parameters set at the median (covariates)
r modal (factors) value. The effect of varying a single covariate or
actor across the range observed within the dataset was then com-
uted. Those covariates or factors with the greatest effect were
ecorded. All statistical analyses were carried out in R software
.2.14.2.
orrelation between relative transmission risk and network
onnectivity
To assess the potential impact on infection propagation between
arms, TRi was cross-classiﬁed with a measure of between-farm
ssociation frequency, informed by the Poultry Network Database
PND). This database consisted of surveys of: (i) single-site and (ii)
ulti-site farm premises, (iii) slaughterhouses and (iv) catchingompanies; these data were used to infer potential associations
etween farms arising through shared industry associations. For
xample, farms that used the same slaughterhouse, catching
ompany or that were integrated as part of a larger companyd and Wales, respectively; note that results for the East of England were excluded
were assumed to be epidemiologically linked (Dent et al., 2008;
Nickbakhsh et al., 2011).
Using these associations informed by the PND, a between-farm
association matrix was generated for the farms captured by the
Catching Company Database that were used in the computation
of TRi (n = 108). The total number of associations per farm was
assumed to represent a maximum potential for propagation via
the poultry network. In this way, correlation between the farm-
level risk of exposing personnel, vehicles and equipment during
farm visits (i.e. as measured through TRi), and the potential risk of
propagation occurring through the industry network, was deter-
mined.
Results
Movement data
A descriptive analysis of the input data showed that the farm-
level mean number of caught birds and average ﬂock size both
increased linearly with the mean daily number of vehicle loads
(Fig. 1a). In contrast, the mean total number of catching days (across
the entire dataset) and ﬂock size decreased with the mean time-
interval between consecutive visit days, Tb (Fig. 1b). Overall, larger
ﬂocks tended to have a greater number of daily vehicle loads, a
greater total number of visits, and a lower Tb. Further inspection of
Tb showed it to have a variance-to-mean ratio exceeding 1, indi-
cating temporal clustering of visits. This temporal clustering at
the farm-level reﬂects two  important activities related to these
catching teams – ﬂock thinning mid-production cycle and partial
depopulation at the end of the production cycle (see Supplemen-
tary Material Section 3 for an example data snapshot highlighting
this temporal pattern of catching team visits).
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Fig. 2. Schematic of the cross-scale interactions between within-ﬂock transmission
dynamics and the timing of catching-team visits. The within-ﬂock dynamics cor-
responding with dead birds (i.e. the R or “removed” model class) and infectious
faeces (i.e. the F or “infectious faeces” model class) follow blue and green curves
respectively. The opportunity for a catching-team visit to coincide with the out-
break is shown for small (dotted lines) and large (solid lines) ﬂock sizes under (a)
frequency-dependent (FD) transmission, and (b) density-dependent (DD) transmis-
sion. Red lines indicate the number of dead birds corresponding with the mortality
Generating farm-level proﬁles for relative transmission riskhip, and (b) the mean time (measured in days) between catching days declines
xponentially with the mean total number of catching days.
For FD transmission, the time-to-detection increased with
ncreasing ﬂock size (solid red arrow compared to dashed red
rrow, Fig. 2a), as previously highlighted (Savill et al., 2008).
owever, for DD transmission, time-to-detection decreased with
ncreasing ﬂock size (solid red arrow compared to dashed red
rrow, Fig. 2b). In this case, greater infection pressure and greater
ovement activity, but more rapid outbreak detection, interacts to
nﬂuence the potential for transmission.
ross-scale interactions at the farm-level
The model simulations, combining the deterministic within-
ock transmission model for HPAI with the catching-team
ovement data, showed that for a given ﬂock size, transmission
ode and mortality threshold, the average TR (across all farms)
ncreased with transmissibility (approximately scaling with the
uild-up of infectious faeces), peaked at high transmissibilities (R0
25–30) and then dropped sharply for even higher transmissi-
ilities – a consequence of the more rapid accumulation of dead
irds. This occurred even for relatively small increases to ˇa or
f of around one additional transmission event per bird per day,threshold (MT). Triangles demonstrate the case where increases to ﬂock size results
in  catching-team visits coinciding with an outbreak (in red), and occurring outside
the outbreak window (in black).
up to a level which depended on the assumed transmission mode
(discussed further below).
For frequency-dependent (FD) transmission, an increase to ﬂock
size increased TR (Fig. 3a and b). However, for density-dependent
(DD) transmission, although TR scaled with ﬂock size for low-mid-
range transmission rates (i.e. ˇa + ˇf < 10), for mid-to-high range
transmission rates (i.e. ˇa + ˇf > 10) earlier disease detection caused
TR to peak at lower transmission rates as ﬂock size increased. This
narrowing of the region of parameter space between the lowest
and highest TR values with an increase to ﬂock size is illustrated by
the relative sizes of the white arrows in Fig. 3c and d. As the num-
ber of dead birds approached the mortality threshold, TR became
highly sensitive to the balance between infectious faeces and time-
to-detection under DD transmission (see bottom right red region
of Fig. 3d); the greater environmental build-up of infectious faecal
material counteracted the shortened time-to-detection for small
regions of parameter space causing TR to oscillate as transmission
parameters varied.
The results presented assume a mortality threshold of 0.5%.
Given the likely variability and lack of recent experience of HPAI
by farmers in Great Britain, we compare this to MTs  of 0.3% and
0.7% (Supplementary Material Section 4). We  note that the range
of infection pressures corresponding with high TR increases with
increasing MT,  whilst the rapid drop in TR phenomenon occurs
later.Tables 3a and 3b show the multivariable model results under
FD and DD transmission respectively. See Supplementary Material
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Fig. 3. Relative transmission risks (TRs) for a range of transmissibility scenarios. Assuming frequency-dependent (FD) transmission (TRFD) for (a) small (∼4500–25,000 birds)
and  (b) large (∼35,000–45,600 birds) ﬂocks, and assuming density-dependent (DD) transmission (TRDD) for (c) small (∼4500–25,000 birds), and (d) large (∼35,000–45,600
birds) ﬂocks. The white arrows in (c) and (d) demonstrate the relative difference in the region of parameter space between the lowest and highest TR as ﬂock size increases
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Dnder  DD transmission. These analyses assumed outbreak detection occurred when
et  to default values (see Table 2).
ection 5 for details of the multivariable model diagnostics. Overall,
he time between consecutive catching-team visit days, Tb, had the
argest average effect on TRi for both transmission modes (linear
oefﬁcients = −0.033, p ≤ 0.008; for both model scenarios). How-
ver, when considering the range of possible effect size across all
arms for each predictor in the multivariable model, ‘mean daily
ehicle loads’ had the potential to have the largest impact under
D transmission (see Supplementary Material Section 6).
The relationship of TRi with ﬂock size varied depending on the
ransmission mode, as shown in Fig. 4; a signiﬁcant effect was  found
able 3a
ultivariable linear regression: effect of farm-level factors on relative transmission risk c
Predictor variablesa Linear model coefﬁcientb
Interceptc 2.114 
Mean  daily vehicle loads 0.002 
Time  between consecutive visit days −0.033 
Network connectivityd 0.0004 
Wales vs. Northe −0.203 
West  vs. Northe 0.096 
able 3b
ultivariable linear regression: effect of farm-level factors on relative transmission risk c
Predictor variablesa Linear model coefﬁcientb
Interceptc 1.792 
Mean  daily vehicle loads 0.002 
Flock  size −3.8 × 10−5
Time  between consecutive visit days −0.033 
Network connectivityd 0.0004 
Mean  daily vehicle loads × ﬂock size −1.2 × 10−7
a See Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions and value ranges.
b Results obtained for square root transformed values of TRi .
c Numeric variables were centred and therefore the intercept corresponds to their aver
d Between-farm association frequency was estimated as a measure of between-farm n
e West and North refer to geographical regions of England. Predictors in bold had the l
ection  6.
f The most inﬂuential data points (based on their Cook’s statistic) were identiﬁed and r
D  analyses, respectively).st 0.5% mortality was reached for two consecutive days. All other parameters were
only in the univariable model under FD transmission (results not
shown, linear coefﬁcient = 4 × 10−5, 95% CI: 2 × 10−5 to 6 × 10−5,
p < 0.0001), whilst under DD transmission the average ﬂock size
had a signiﬁcant negative impact in the multivariable model, an
effect which was  further modiﬁed by ‘mean daily vehicle loads’
(interaction parameter between ‘ﬂock size’ and ‘mean daily vehicle
loads’ = −1.21 × 10−7, p < 0.0001). Therefore, for DD transmission,
the relationship with ‘mean daily vehicle loads’ was seen most
clearly for small and medium sized ﬂocks, with TR peaking at mid-
range ﬂock sizes (∼25,000–30,000 birds).
omputed for frequency-dependent within-ﬂock transmission, TR
FD
i (n = 98
f farms).
95% conﬁdence intervals p-Value
1.989 to 2.239 <0.0001
0.0016 to 0.0026 <0.0001
−0.054 to −0.013 0.002
−5.26 × 10−5 to 0.001 0.077
−0.564 to 0.157 0.266
−0.214 to 0.405 0.541
omputed for density-dependent within-ﬂock transmission, TR
DD
i (n = 96
f farms).
95% conﬁdence intervals p-Value
1.655 to 1.929 <0.0001
0.0014 to 0.003 <0.0001
−5.03 × 10−5 to −2.53 × 10−5 <0.0001
−0.0575 to −0.0087 0.008
−0.0002 to 0.001 0.212
−1.7 × 10−7 to −7.09 × 10−8 <0.0001
age values.
etwork connectivity.
argest possible range of effect sizes across all farms – see Supplementary Material
emoved from these analyses (n = 2 and n = 4 data points were removed from FD and
S. Nickbakhsh et al. / Epidem
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
0
1
2
3
Daily vehicle loads
D
D
TR
(b)
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
0
1
2
3
4
Daily vehicle loads
FD
TR
(a)
Average Flock Size
≤25,000
     25,001 - 35,000
     35,001 - 45,667
Average Flock Size
≤25,000
     25,001 - 35,000
     35,001 - 45,667
Fig. 4. The effect of average ﬂock size and mean daily vehicle loads on the rela-
tive transmission risk (a) assuming frequency-dependent (FD) transmission, and
(b)  assuming density-dependent (DD) transmission. See Table 2 for a full descrip-
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practice of ﬂock-thinning, might be particularly detrimental for DDion  of the model variables. The transmission risk corresponds with a mid-range
evel of transmissibility where ˇa ∼ 5 and ˇf ∼ 5.
enerating between-farm proﬁles for relative transmission risk
Fig. 5 shows the distribution of between-farm association
requencies for slaughterhouse, catching company, integrated com-
any and combined layers of the poultry network, for all farms
ecorded in the Catching Company Database (n = 108). However,
t should be noted that the median between-farm association fre-
uency overall combining all network layers, when based on the
ull Poultry Network Database, was estimated to be 343 farms
range = 105–1453 farms).
Farms with high estimates for both between-farm associations
nd TRi would produce the highest risk of a widespread epidemic.
hen cross-classifying the between-farm association frequency
ith TRi, a large proportion of farms had a below median value for
oth factors (21% of farms, see bottom left quadrant of Fig. 6). How-
ver, a further 21% of farms had a relatively low estimate of TRi and
 relatively high estimate of between-farm association frequency
see top left quadrant of Fig. 6). The largest fraction of farms (28%)
ad the highest risk combination, with above median estimates
or both factors (see top right quadrant of Fig. 6). No difference was
ound in the distribution of farms between FD and DD transmission
odes when dichotomising TRi by median values.ics 5 (2013) 67–76 73
Discussion
Cross-population scale interactions
The integration of infection transmission dynamics at the
within-group and population level is increasingly important as
greater demands are made of predictive mathematical models
(Haydon and Matthews, 2007; Kao et al., 2007). For pathogens that
are likely to spread rapidly within a farm, the risk of onward trans-
mission via fomites depends on the opportunity for an on-to-farm
movement to coincide with an outbreak. We have explored the
importance of these cross-scale interactions for highly pathogenic
avian inﬂuenza (HPAI) within the British commercial broiler poul-
try industry. By considering the interaction between the farm-level
infectious period and explicit temporal pattern of catching-team
visits, our results have implications for the between-farm spread,
or the network dynamics, of HPAI.
Poultry ﬂock size may  be indicative of both the time to detection
of an outbreak, and the expected amount of on-to-farm movement
activity. However, this does not account for the trade-off between
the build-up of faecal virus within the poultry house and the oppor-
tunity for virus exposure. Our results suggest that the overall effect
of ﬂock size on the relative transmission risk (TR) is sensitive
to the bird-to-bird transmission mode. For frequency-dependent
(FD) transmission, the time-to-detection increased with ﬂock size
(Fig. 2a), as highlighted previously by Savill et al. (2008). How-
ever, for density-dependent (DD) transmission, greater infection
pressure and greater movement activity, but more rapid outbreak
detection, interacts to inﬂuence the opportunity for onward spread
from larger ﬂocks (Fig. 2b). This interaction had not previously been
considered with respect to HPAI within commercial poultry.
As the infection pressure (i.e. ˇa + ˇf) increased, so did the
amount of infectious faeces thus increasing TR;  this counteracted
the shortened time-to-detection for DD transmission for some
regions of transmissibility but TR was highly sensitive to the bal-
ance between these factors causing an oscillatory effect (Fig. 3d).
Overall, mid-range sized ﬂocks (∼25,000–35,000 birds) were found
to have the greatest TR under DD transmission, in contrast to larger
ﬂocks (∼35,000–45,600 birds) under FD transmission.
Faeces are not removed mid  production cycle in British com-
mercial broiler chicken farms, therefore it was  assumed that the TR
depended on the product of available infectious faecal material and
the number of vehicle loads. However, a nonlinear dependence (e.g.
an upper contamination threshold) could change the sensitivity to
ﬂock size and the impact of transmission mode assumptions. Given
the lack of empirical data available in relation to viral survival times
we assumed a constant rate of viral decay in line with previous pub-
lished studies (Savill et al., 2006, 2008). Whilst we cannot postulate
the appropriateness of alternative assumptions, we  anticipate that
this would not impact on our qualitative results.
Generating farm-level risk proﬁles
The identiﬁcation of predominantly movement-related pre-
dictors that depend on the bird-to-bird transmission mode has
important implications for disease control strategies. For exam-
ple, the multivariable regression analyses suggest that reducing
the overall frequency of on-to-farm visits would be more effective
for FD transmission, in contrast to limiting the clustering of con-
secutive visit days for DD transmission (Tables 3a and 3b). As the
temporal clustering of visits at the farm-level was strong, activi-
ties requiring on-to-farm visits mid-production cycle, such as thetransmission characteristics. Such practices are recognised risk fac-
tors for disease transmission within the British poultry industry
(ACMSF, 2005; Slader et al., 2002). An improved understanding
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ˇig. 5. Between-farm association frequency distributions. Between-farm association
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ransmission risk had been generated (n = 108 farms).
f the likely bird-to-bird contact behaviour, and therefore the
redominant mechanism of transmission within a poultry ﬂock,
s needed to better characterise this risk.
In our model, the highest potential for spread via catching-
eam visits was associated with outbreaks of HPAI virus with
—TRi
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ig. 6. Cross classifying relative transmission risk with the between-farm asso-
iation frequency. The total number of between-farm associations was used to
ndicate network connectivity via shared slaughterhouses, catching companies or
hrough company integration, per farm. The horizontal line indicates the median
etween-farm association frequency; the vertical line indicates the median TR. The
ransmission risk corresponds with a mid-range level of transmissibility where
a ∼ 5 and ˇf ∼ 5.e assumed to occur through farms sharing (a) the same slaughterhouse, (b) catching
ayers. These results were generated using a subset of farms for which estimates of
high transmissibility (R0 ∼25–30), in large broiler ﬂocks, under FD
transmission. Delayed detection of the outbreak by a farmer (as
demonstrated by increases to the mortality threshold triggering
outbreak detection, see Supplementary Material Section 4) would
further increase this risk. Delayed notiﬁcation might be expected
for less virulent poultry pathogens such as low pathogenic avian
inﬂuenza (LPAI), which despite sometimes signiﬁcant mortality
(Bano et al., 2003), typically has less severe morbidity and lower
mortality (Defra, 2006). This observation has important implica-
tions for the spread of HPAI, as the undetected circulation of LPAI
virus precursors may  increase the likelihood of a subsequent HPAI
outbreak (Mannelli et al., 2006).
Though particular HPAI subtypes, such as H5N1, are expected
to be detected relatively rapidly, with some analyses indicat-
ing no longer than one week (Yoon et al., 2005), evidence from
experimental work using the H7N7 subtype, implicated in an out-
break in the Netherlands in 2003, suggests that HPAI may  have
been left to circulate within a ﬂock undetected for 11–15 days
(Bos et al., 2007). Due to the difﬁculties in directly extrapo-
lating from experimental studies typically involving very few
birds (i.e. typically a maximum of ﬁve susceptible in-contact
birds, in the absence of concurrent infection and environmental
factors that may  enhance transmission under ﬁeld conditions),
the upper limit for transmission rates in relation to commer-
cial poultry ﬂocks may  be greater than estimated by these
studies.In view of this likely variability between virus subtypes, and
the possible under-estimation of transmission rates by experimen-
tal studies, we  explored a range of time to detections (2–10 days),
representing a range of plausible HPAI outbreak characteristics,
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eﬂecting in particular the most virulent HPAI viruses. Further-
ore, in view of the impact of farmer behaviour, we  also considered
 range of mortality thresholds, MTs, and ﬁnd that as the MT
ncreases, TR increases for a greater range of infection pressures; for
arge ﬂocks and thresholds beyond 0.7% we might not observe the
rapid drop in TR”  phenomenon as the infection pressure increases
ithin the range considered (see Supplementary Material Section
).
enerating between-farm risk proﬁles
If the most highly connected farms also have a high TR,  the over-
ll risk of a widespread outbreak could be high; this was the case for
8% of farms in these analyses. However, a large proportion of farms
42%) had discordant network-connectivity and relative transmis-
ion risk characteristics (Fig. 6); approximately half of these (21%)
ad a low estimate of TR (corresponding to a mid-range transmissi-
ility scenario, TRi) but a high between-farm association frequency.
n this case a high impact at the between-farm level but with a low
ssociated risk of occurrence could be construed as representing a
edium-level risk.
A more detailed understanding of the relative importance of
arm-level transmission “risk” and between-farm “impact” would
llow us to better characterise farms and determine the most
ppropriate control measures. For example, categorising farms
ased on combinations of exposure “risk” and overall “impact” may
nable the effective targeting of control measures – via a relatively
reater focus on preventive measures such as farm-level biosecu-
ity for farms with high estimated transmission risk, and a relatively
reater focus on contact-tracing during an outbreak for farms with
igh estimated between-farm association frequency. Farms with
igh estimates for both factors warrant the greatest focus from
revention and control measures.
The most crucial factor for minimising the risk of spread
etween farms will be the rapidity with which farmers notify and
eport a suspected outbreak, as discussed for farm-level risk proﬁles
n relation to assumed mortality thresholds. In this regard, further
onsideration must be given to the potential negative consequences
ssociated with notiﬁable HPAI and the risk of false-alarms (Savill
t al., 2008) that may  be perceived by individual farmers. Ulti-
ately, when developing a risk proﬁle different aspects of risk –
nitial incursion vs. the potential for spread between farms, as well
s the scale of observation – each have different implications for
mplementing control measures.
onclusions
We  have shown how particular assumptions for within-farm
ynamics result in counter-intuitive implications for pathogen
pread at the population-level; increased transmissibility at the
ithin-farm level sometimes presents a reduced transmission risk
o other farms. This is the ﬁrst demonstration of the potential
mportance of these cross-scale interactions for HPAI in a commer-
ial poultry industry. Together with consideration to the relative
mportance of network connectivity, these ﬁndings have implica-
ions for the targeting of HPAI control measures at the farm-level.
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